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Problem of Sharecrop Tenancy System in Rice Farming in Bangladesh:a Case Study on Alinapara Village in Sherpur District

M. Aminul Islam Akanda
Ph. D. student, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Faculty of Agriculture, Kyushu University, Hakozaki 6-10-1, Higashiku, Fukuoka 812-8581, Japan.

Hiroshi Isoda
Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Faculty of Agriculture, Kyushu University, Hakozaki 6-10-1, Higashiku, Fukuoka 812-8581, Japan.

Shoichi Ito
Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Faculty of Agriculture, Kyushu University, Hakozaki 6-10-1, Higashiku, Fukuoka 812-8581, Japan.

Abstract/ Executive Summary:

The 1984 Land Reform Act in Bangladesh fixed land rent for sharecropping tenants at 33% of harvest yield without input sharing and at 50% with 50% of input sharing. This positively influenced expansion of HYV rice farming. However, the returns for tenants fell over time because of a gradual increase in input prices and wages. This research analysed the present distribution of returns in the dominant rice farming area in Bangladesh. A field survey was conducted in an advanced rice farming village where sharecropping was practiced. There was semi feudalism in the tenancy market with landowners earning more from sharecropping than they could from cash renting. Land-rich farmers often cultivated only a small part of their cultivable land and rented out most of it. The existing economic structure did not fairly balance the returns between tenants and landowners. This study suggested the need to reset the land rent at 20% of harvest yield without input sharing and at 40% with input sharing, to protect land-poor tenants.

Keywords: Land reform, Sharecrop tenancy, Rice farming, Bangladesh

Location: Sherpur, Bangladesh

Start Date: 00-00-1996

End Date:

Program Area: Socio-economic and Policy

Non-commodity: Constraints

Objectives:

The objectives of this research were

to evaluate the rewards to sharecropping tenants from cost and return analyses and
to identify a possible solution to the tenancy problem.

Methodology:

Selection of study area The Sherpur was selected as a typical district from 64 districts in Bangladesh. In 1996, 31.2% of the farmers were tenants including 11.5% pure tenants (BBS, 2002), which was consistent with national figures of 33.8% and 10.2%, respectively (BBS, 1999). Nearly 75% of the tenanted area in the district was sharecropped in 2002/3 (DAE, 2004). The problems in sharecrop tenancy in rice farming were analysed in Alinapara village because sharecropping was practiced in that village and rice farming occupied 85% of the total cropped area. Sample and data: This research used secondary data collected from statistical reports of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) and Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE), Sherpur Office. The primary data were collected from a field survey in September 2004. Current data about the village was collected from the local Agriculture Officer and from discussions with groups of farmers. For farm-level data collection, farmers were classified as small (owning up to 1 ha), medium (1 to 3 ha), and large (above 3 ha). Analytical tools: The cost accounting method was used to analyse the costs and returns from rice. The cost of production was the sum of the land, material inputs, labour and tillage costs. Tillage cost was taken at Tk. 1,400 per ha, which was the average charge of power tillers in the village. Labour cost was the sum of family and hired labour costs, which were calculated using an average wage rate of Tk 70 /man-day estimated by Department of Agricultural Extension, Sherpur (2004). The material input cost included the cost of seeds, fertilizers, irrigation and pesticides. The land cost of Tk. 6,175 per ha per crop season was the cash rent estimated by BBS (2005) for 1999/2000 and by DAE Sherpur (2004) for 2002/3. Some farmers cultivated mortgage-in land taking the rights to land from landowners for a handsome refundable cash deposit. The land cost for mortgage-in land was calculated as the interest payable on the deposit. In the case of input share-tenancy, tenants paid the labour and tillage costs plus 50% of material input costs. Landowners paid 50% of material input costs. The returns from rice farming were the value of rice receipts at Tk 8 per kg plus the value of by-product at Tk. 3,700 per ha. Landowners’ return under input share-tenancy was 50% of the rice with tenants’ receiving 50% of the rice plus the straw. The profitability of rice farming was estimated as the net return and also disposable rice income. The net return per ha was the total return less total cost including land cost, divided by the total rice area. The disposable rice income was the sum of the net return and costs for land and family labour not payable as cash expenses.

Source of Information: Journal of International Farm Management Vol.4. No.2 - February 2008

Article Link (Online Journal): http://docserver.ingentaconnect.com/deliver/connect/iagrm/18162495/v4n2/s1.pdf?expires=1455723891&id=86074578&titleid=41000063&accname=Guest+User&checksum=D65643F592FCD69EF2E2770520FC91AE

Funding Source:

Budget:

Total Budget (Tk.) :

Achievement/Findings:

The land poor farmers preferred rice farming on both the operated and rented out area as the crop was easily sold and it was easy to collect their share under the share-tenancy system. The large and medium farmers preferred to rent-out most of their land and employ tenants. The large farmer from share-tenancy earned about 70% more than cash renting after paying 50% of material input costs. On the other hand, tenants received a lesser share from their rented-in farms. The distribution of costs fixed in the 1984 Land Reform Act could no longer support tenants. There were inequalities in rewards not balanced by economic forces. New legislation to re-fix the returns at 20% harvest for land, 40% for tillage & labor, and 40% for inputs would assist tenants. This research evaluated sharecropping in one village where there was a risk of sudden and seasonal floods. However, the share-tenancy system was found to be changing towards cash and in kind rent tenancy systems in some other areas in the country. The economic agents for these transformations are important issues in analyzing agrarian changes. Any future study should be extended to evaluate the cash, in-kind as well as sharecropping to strengthen any recommendation.

Knowledge Management: Journal